





range itself needs to be a bit elastic to allow for
special circumstances that might be important in
a particular year. Others on the Fed’s main policy
body, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) might prefer to state the goal somewhat
differently, but I believe that all of us have in
mind inflation goals that are so close one to the
other that differences in the goal are not really
an issue.
However, there is an important issue that I
struggle with every time I go to an FOMC meeting:
What policy will yield an outcome close to the
inflation goal? The task is certainly not as easy
as it might appear in textbooks. Today, I would
like to discuss with you practical aspects of
pursuing a policy that yields price stability. My
remarks will expand on themes that I have
addressed in several previous talks.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues in the
Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis for their comments; Dick Anderson,
vice president, and Kevin Kliesen, associate
economist, provided special assistance. I retain
full responsibility for errors.
My plan is this: I’ll start with some basic, but
very important theory and explain why theory is
not enough for practical monetary policymaking.
That will bring me to my approach of tracking
inflation. Finally, I will discuss briefly the current
inflation environment and the near-term outlook
for inflation.
C
ongress has charged the Federal
Reserve with a dual mandate: to
achieve and maintain both price sta-
bility and high employment. Although
there was a time when these two goals were
viewed as competitive, today it is largely agreed
that price stability provides the foundation upon
which households and firms are able to make
the decisions that bring the economy to its high-
est sustainable level of employment and most
rapid sustainable rate of economic growth. More-
over, Federal Reserve success in achieving price
stability, and in obtaining a high degree of market
confidence that price stability will remain the
norm for the economy in the future, gives the
Fed the freedom to react quickly, and massively
if necessary, to shocks that threaten to raise
unemployment to unacceptable levels.
I have said previously that I favor a goal of
zero inflation, properly measured. In practice,
because of various statistical problems in meas-
uring prices, that goal translates, approximately,
to price changes of something like a 1 percent
annual rate of increase in the chain-price index
for personal consumption expenditures—the
PCE price index for short.
In its day-to-day policymaking, the Fed
focuses on the core PCE price index, which
excludes volatile food and energy prices that
monetary policy can do little about. On average
over time, the total and core indexes change at
almost identical rates. Even putting volatile food
and energy prices aside, it is not possible to
achieve an inflation target precisely year by year;
thus, my goal might be stated as a change in the
core PCE index of 0.5 to 1.5 percent per year. ThatMACROECONOMIC THEORY
There is an enormous amount of evidence
that inflation is fundamentally a monetary phe-
nomenon, caused by too much money chasing
too few goods. Yet, policymakers today spend
hardly any effort tracking money growth. How
can that be?
There is a proposition in control theory that
when control is optimal—policy instruments are
optimally adjusted to achieve the intended goal—
the correlation between the instrument and the
goal will become zero. Consider a car analogy.
No one has any doubt that the amount of fuel fed
to the engine regulates how fast the car goes. All
other things equal, higher fuel flow will yield
higher speed. Now consider a car traveling in
mountainous country with the cruise control set
for 65 miles per hour. Suppose you measured
fuel flow and speed. You would record large
fluctuations in fuel flow and hardly any fluctua-
tions in speed. Would you conclude that fuel flow
has nothing to do with the car’s speed?
Let’s pursue this analogy a bit further. Examin-
ing the data closely, you might find a slight nega-
tive correlation between speed and fuel flow.
When the car is going down hill, speed may rise
a bit above 65 and fuel flow be below average;
similarly, going up hill you might observe speed
a bit below 65 and fuel flow above average. But
you would not conclude that higher fuel flow
reduces speed. When you understand the funda-
mental determinants of car speed, you will not
be fooled by a short-run correlation between
speed and fuel flow.
Knowing the characteristics of the cruise
control, a driver can do a bit better in controlling
speed than the cruise control by itself. A driver
looking ahead can back off the accelerator a bit
before the crest of a hill to avoid going above 65
down the hill, and press on the accelerator a little
before starting up a hill to avoid dropping below
65. Every driver has the experience of noticing
that the cruise control doesn’t look ahead—it only
reacts to the speed of the car itself. A successful
driver will eliminate the slight negative correla-
tion between speed and fuel flow that arises from
the lag in the cruise control’s operation because
it cannot look ahead.
As with a car’s cruise control, supplemented
by an alert driver, Federal Reserve success in
taming inflation has destroyed the statistical cor-
relation between the causal variable and goal
variable—money growth and inflation. Because
the relationship between money growth and
inflation is irregular—especially at a low rate of
inflation—the Fed does not attempt to control
inflation by achieving a money growth target.
Instead, the Fed sets a target for the federal funds
rate—the overnight interest rate in the interbank
lending market for reserves on deposit at Federal
Reserve Banks. The federal funds rate is the base
interest rate in the financial system, influencing
all other rates such as the rate on home mortgages.
How does the Fed control inflation as success-
fully as it does? The Fed extracts as much infor-
mation as it can from all the data and anecdotal
reports available. An important aspect of this
work is to track the inflation process—the internal
dynamics of the inflation rate. That is my main
topic today.
TRACKING INFLATION
The idea I’ll explore is that the Fed leans
against pressures that would move the inflation
rate outside the desired range, like the driver
who watches the speedometer and the terrain
ahead to decide whether to step more or less
hard on the accelerator or tap the brake.
The basic framework has been around for a
long time. Marvin Goodfriend presented a sum-
mary of the framework at a conference at the St.
Louis Fed last year.1 He notes that the core ideas
of macroeconomists regarding inflation circa
1970 were:
First, prices of goods and services are use-
fully regarded as markups from unit labor costs,
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1 Goodfriend (2005).adjusted to normal operating rates and produc-
tivity trends. Rates of increase of prices and
wages depend on recent trends, on expectations
of future movements, and on the tightness of
markets for products and labor.
Variations in aggregate demand, whether a
consequence of policy actions or other events,
affect the course of wages, prices, output, and
employment by altering the tightness of labor
and product markets.
The tightness of markets may be measured
by the utilization rates of productive resources,
including reported or adjusted unemployment
rates and capacity operating rates. At any given
utilization rate, real output tends to grow at a
steady pace, reflecting trends in supplies of labor
and capital and in productivity.
Inflation rises at high employment rates
because tight markets systematically and repeat-
edly generate wage and price increases in addi-
tion to those already incorporated in expectations
and historical patterns.
There exists a Friedman-Phelps “natural” rate
of labor market tightness—the non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU—at
which the degree of resource utilization gener-
ates no upward or downward pressure on wages
and prices and is consistent with expected paths
of output, employment and prices as seen by
workers and firms. In equilibrium, the expected
path of prices is a steady rate of inflation, abstract-
ing from temporary disturbances.
The 1970 view contained a causal chain flow-
ing from tightness of labor markets to inflation.
Unemployment below the NAIRU would cause
wages to rise more quickly. Because productivity
growth was viewed as largely independent of
wage-price determination, higher wage growth
would increase the rate of growth of unit labor
costs. Cost increases, in turn, would lead firms
to raise prices to maintain normal profit margins.
In time, inflation expectations would rise to
reflect higher actual inflation and then wages
would also rise more rapidly. There could be no
equilibrium unless the unemployment rate set-
tled at the NAIRU. Monetary policy was often
viewed as passive, accommodating wage and
price increases lest a recession result. Researchers
commonly added special shocks to the basic
framework. Price shocks from food, energy and
exchange rate changes were thought to come
from outside the fundamental determinants of
wage and price inflation.
Academic researchers and Federal Reserve
economists and policymakers continue to employ
this framework, but important aspects have
changed. Most critically, in the 1970 framework
the formation of expectations about inflation was
assumed to be largely backward-looking; this
approach soon changed as a consequence of work
by Thomas Sargent, Robert Lucas and others.
Although we could simply observe and track
inflation directly, and stop there, the more detailed
wage-price framework is useful. In setting mone-
tary policy there is relevant information beyond
the inflation rate itself; we gain insight by exploit-
ing the identity that inflation is equal to the rate
of change of unit labor costs multiplied by a
markup factor.2
In working with this conceptual framework,
it is sometimes convenient to begin with wage
determination in the labor market. But I prefer to
think of the description starting with the labor
market as simply a convenient place to break into
the circle of simultaneous determination, in which
wages, prices, employment, output, productivity
and profit margins are all determined together.
Wage determination depends on all the factors
that affect labor supply and demand decisions,
including inflation expectations and trend pro-
ductivity gains. That is, nothing is determined
“first” or independently of the other variables.
This is a complex framework and requires
judgment in application. The wage determination
process involves numerous variables and, most
likely, some bargaining situations where the out-
come is uncertain. The markup pricing assump-
tion requires information regarding the price
elasticities of demand, and how they change
through time and over the business cycle. For
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2 Kohn (2005b).example, firms facing intense international com-
petition may have difficulty passing along cost
increases. Such firms may suffer lower profit
margins in the face of cost increases rather than
be able to increase prices.
The direction of causation can run either
direction. Suppose a firm finds competitive
pressures increasing—it may be able to pass that
pressure backward into wages and the labor mar-
ket. The recent experiences of U.S. airline workers
and some automobile parts workers are examples.
In other cases, firms may not be able to resist
upward pressure on wages and thus wage pres-
sure may show up in pressure on prices. A current
example might be wages of truck drivers; with
robust demand for drivers and a limited supply
of persons willing to spend long periods on the
road away from their families, driver wages are
rising.
Rapid changes in technology also are not
easily addressed within the model: Does a favor-
able technology shock increase employment
because each worker is now more productive, or
does it reduce employment, despite decreases in
unit costs, because the price elasticity of demand
is small? The answers are far from obvious, and
answers that might be correct for a single firm
need not be correct for the aggregate economy.
In modern macroeconomic models, market
behavior depends on central bank behavior,
because market expectations depend on what
the central bank is expected to do. Thus, in these
models the behavior of the central bank is gov-
erned by rules, and central banks are almost
always assumed to conduct monetary policy by
choosing a target for a short-term nominal rate of
interest.
Perhaps the best-known policy rule is that
proposed by John Taylor in 1993. I have previ-
ously discussed the relationship between the
Taylor rule and current Fed policymaking.3 Here,
I wish to note two aspects. First, central banks
that use a nominal interest rate as the policy
instrument must adjust that target more than
one-to-one in response to movements in inflation,
so as to increase the real short rate when actual
and expected inflation increase and to decrease
the real short rate when actual and expected
inflation decreases. Second, policy outcomes
generally will be better when the target rate
responds to the gap between economic activity
and the economy’s potential level of activity.
A prominent result obtained from these
modeling efforts is that the ease with which the
central bank achieves its goals of price stability
and maximum sustainable economic growth is
directly related to the transparency and credibility
of its policymaking. This idea, by itself, of course,
is not new. But the models make clearer the
inter-relationship between the decisionmaking
processes of central bank policymakers and
those of households and firms.
In part because both households and firms
are modeled as primarily forward-looking, the
preferred variable for tracking the likely future
path of inflation in such models is the market’s
own expectation of future inflation. Data regard-
ing market expectations of inflation are available
from surveys—including the Michigan, Blue Chip,
and Philadelphia Fed surveys—and from the
market for Treasury inflation-protected securities
(TIPS). Within the Federal Reserve, forecasting
inflation based on current and proposed future
policy settings is an important responsibility of
the FOMC staff.
Although market expectations of inflation
are extremely important for Fed policymaking,
they are not enough. The Fed wants to look down
the road, so that it can adjust its fed funds rate
target to prevent inflation and inflation expecta-
tions from changing in the first place. Clearly,
the inflation rate does change and so the Fed is
not completely successful. But inflation expecta-
tions have been quite stable in recent years, which
means that the Fed does a good job of responding
to available information, and in retaining market
confidence, so that the market does not have a
solid basis for major changes in its inflation
outlook.
3 Poole (2005b).
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TRACKING INFLATION
In a 2005 paper, James Stock and Mark Watson,
using data through the end of 2004, conclude
• that inflation has become “easier” to fore-
cast, in the sense that models have low
forecast errors because inflation rates have
been low and stable; and
• that inflation has become “more difficult”
to forecast in the sense that the contribution
to the forecast of variables other than lags
of inflation has largely vanished.
On balance, Stock and Watson’s results tell us
that “tracking inflation” has become easier than
it was a decade ago—because the rate is lower
and varies less—but also is more difficult because
future inflation is far less sensitive to measures
of real economic activity. These results are funda-
mentally a consequence, I believe, of the Fed’s
success in forecasting inflation, and in adjusting
policy so that inflation remains quite steady.
REAL-WORLD POLICY MAKING
Forecasts presented to the FOMC by its staff
combine model-based information with judgment.
A major element of the story is that the Fed is
successful in extracting information from observ-
able data used in models by applying information
beyond observable data. That is where judgment
is critically important.
Policymakers often have to act “observation
by observation,” evaluating incoming data and
responding to events. Examples include the Asian
financial market crisis; the international capital
markets events that felled Long Term Capital
Management; the 9/11 terrorist attacks; and, most
recently, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Moreover,
large shocks often differ from each other in their
size and effect, further taxing the knowledge,
skills and judgment of policymakers.
Finally, there are some “shocks” that appear
gradually, surrounded by controversy and dis-
agreement—the 1990s rise of productivity growth
is such an example. FOMC transcripts show that
Chairman Greenspan was concerned as early as
1992 that official data were understating produc-
tivity growth.4 No model would have substituted
for his experience, intuition, and discussions
with industry contacts.
The theoretical price determination model
provides the framework within which detailed
judgments based on anecdotal and other informa-
tion are brought into policy decisions. Inflation-
tracking involves tracking market expectations
of inflation and a careful analysis of wage trends,
productivity and profit margins. All of these
help me to frame my outlook for inflation and
what monetary policy would be appropriate to
maintain an inflation rate that can be described
as “low and stable.”
It is highly desirable that policy practice be
formalized to the maximum extent possible—
that is a clear implication of modern forward-
looking models. However, monetary economists
have not yet developed a formal rule that is likely
to have better operating properties than the Fed’s
current practice. Current Fed policy practices
have a large systematic component, even though
I could not write down that practice in its entirety
in either a single equation or a set of equations.
Consider a recent example. In the absence of
other information, slow employment growth in
September and October 2005 would ordinarily
be interpreted as evidence that the economy is
weakening and that, in time, inflation risks would
probably fall. However, both the market and the
Fed realized that recent employment data were of
limited value because distortions from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita were so large. The data were
discounted for good reason; the interpretation of
the data was transparent and predictable, once
the aberrations in the data were observed. But it
would not have been possible to explain in
advance exactly how to handle the suspect data.
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4 Anderson and Kliesen (2005).The Fed’s current policy rule is a pattern of
behavior which yields an environment in which
policy actions are highly, though not perfectly,
predictable in the markets. Operating policy by
such a rule makes tracking inflation a far simpler
task than in the “bad old days” when markets
formed their expectations and forecasts without a
clear understanding of the policymaking process.
CURRENT INFLATION
DEVELOPMENTS
So far, I have spoken primarily about the
macroeconomics of tracking inflation. I’ll close
with a brief discussion of the current inflation
environment.
Energy prices are the big story. Since February
2002, the energy component of the PCE price
index has increased by 85 percent, while the
core PCE (that is, excluding food and energy) has
increased less than 7 percent. Neither the Fed
nor the market anticipated energy price increases
anything close to what we have observed.
Measures of total inflation reflect the effect
of energy prices. Through the first nine months
of 2005, the total PCE index increased at a 4 per-
cent annual rate, on track for the fastest annual
increase since 1990. The total consumer price
index (CPI) shows an even bleaker picture,
increasing to date at a 5 percent annual rate, the
fastest since 1981.5 Such inflation rates raise
concerns regarding erosion of households’ real
purchasing power, even if they are not due to
monetary factors.
To date, it appears that little of the energy
price increase has bled over into core inflation.
Core PCE inflation has been fairly stable for the
past several years, and I anticipate it will remain
so. My prediction that little of the energy price
inflation will bleed into core inflation is based
on my belief that inflation expectations are well-
anchored and my observation that the FOMC has
tightened its policy stance considerably. Moreover,
the FOMC has a clear commitment to price sta-
bility, and that leads me to believe that the Com-
mittee will adjust its policy stance in the future
as required by incoming information. If new infor-
mation calls for further tightening—and I empha-
size the “if” because I do not have a crystal ball
that permits me to predict incoming information—
then that is what the FOMC will do.
Numerous improvements in its communica-
tion with the public during the last decade have
increased the public’s understanding of monetary
policymaking, and made clear the Fed’s commit-
ment to price stability.6 Nevertheless, higher
energy prices are a change in relative prices that
will inevitably lead to changes in other relative
prices—an increase in the price of gasoline rela-
tive to other goods and services, for example,
affects SUV prices and sales.
Energy price increases will affect other
prices, at least for the medium term, but should
have little impact on longer-run inflation expec-
tations. In my earlier analysis of New Keynesian
models, I suggested that evidence regarding the
appropriateness of monetary policy’s stance can
be gleaned from market inflation expectations.
What are these data saying? For TIPS, current
rate spreads relative to non-indexed Treasuries
suggest all-items CPI inflation of approximately
2.5 percent, essentially unchanged from last
year. Since increases in the CPI tend to be approxi-
mately half a percentage point greater than the
core PCE deflator, these figures suggest the market
has considerable faith in the FOMC’s commitment
to price stability.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters and
the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer
CPI inflation expectations yield similar results. I
would offer a word of caution, however, regard-
ing over-interpreting market-based expectation
measures. Paradoxically, if the Fed ever becomes
perfectly credible with respect to its policy goals,
the resulting credibility will destroy the informa-
tion flowing back to it from financial markets:
5 Annual inflation is measured December-to-December.
6 Poole (2005a) provides a chronological list of such communication improvements.
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private sector, it would see reflected back only its
own image. It is for this reason that I have empha-
sized that policymakers cannot relax—we need
to do the best we can digging into information of
all sorts to provide the clearest possible view
down the road so that policy adjustments pre-
empt inflation. My goal is for the Fed to become
perfectly credible.
Although analyzing the likely effect of energy
prices on core prices is a major issue today,
because energy price changes have been so large,
we are also faced with some puzzles elsewhere.
In the third quarter, wages as measured by non-
farm compensation per hour are 5.8 percent above
the year-ago level, whereas the Employment
Cost Index is only 2.9 percent higher than a year
ago. I do not myself understand fully the discrep-
ancy between these two measures of wage change.
Productivity growth is holding up well, with the
third quarter observation for nonfarm output per
hour 2.9 percent above its level a year ago. The
corporate profits share of GDP is back to its 1997
peak, suggesting that companies do have increased
pricing power enabling them to expand profit
margins.
Putting all these indicators together, core
inflation and inflation expectations have been
contained, but underlying determinants of infla-
tion suggest caution. Depending on what measure
is used, wage change has been about steady or
has risen. The profit share of GDP has risen, sug-
gesting that firms have increased pricing power.
Fortunately, productivity growth remains robust.
To move to a pre-automobile metaphor, we
are doing our best to keep the door closed before
the core inflation horse leaves the barn. The situ-
ation is a bit complicated. The energy price horse
did escape the barn and, in my view, there wasn’t
a thing the Fed could do about it without wreck-
ing the barn. But we have done what we could to
keep the other horses in the barn. My outlook is
that the other horses will stay in the barn and
that we have been wise not to have overreacted
to energy price increases.
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